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Barron and Klein (2016; Klein & Barron 2016) discuss the origins of consciousness in
invertebrates, focusing on insects. They use a neuroethological approach to assess
insects’ capacity for subjective experience. Singling out the insect cephalic ganglion, they
explore insects’ neural modeling of space. Moving “beyond insects,” they go on to cover
box jellies and nematodes, but surprisingly they omit the most likely example of
consciousness in invertebrates: Cephalopod molluscs have large central brains and
flexible behavior. Based on neural and behavioral evidence including lateralization of the
brain, tool use, spatial memory and navigation, concept formation and even personality
and sense of self, Mather (2007) has suggested that cephalopods are capable of
subjective experience and that they use the global workplace outlined by Baars (1997)
and also mentioned by Klein and Barron.
Based partly on this evidence, a group of prominent neuroscientists declared in 2012 that
consciousness is not confined to mammalian neural structures and that “[n]on-human
animals, including all mammals and birds, and many other creatures, including octopuses,
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also possess these neurological substrates” (Low 2012). Whereas insects too may be
candidates for inclusion in the category of sentient animals, cephalopods have already
been accepted as such by these neuroscientists; hence it is surprising that the present
authors ignored this declaration. Further evidence for subjective experiences would be
provided by pain, which is by definition a subjective experience.
Alupay and colleagues (2015) have published the latest in a series of studies on
cephalopods looking for behavioral evidence of such experiences. They observed
immediate wound tending, longer term arm guarding, and 24-hour withdrawal from
touch along with long-term sensitization in nerves, causing both local and general
lowering of sensory thresholds. They cautiously concluded that pain was difficult to prove,
suggesting that this might be a case of immediate sensory nociception. Evidence for
cephalopods’ advanced cognitive capacity is presented in the chapters of Cephalopod
Cognition (Dickel et al. 2014), including sensitive periods for learning, neural
representation of space, play, and the use of visual information for camouflage.
A further consequence of this growing evidence of consciousness in cephalopods is an
increasing recognition of the need to consider their welfare in animal experimentation
(Berry et al. 2015). In Canada, cephalopods have been granted consideration of welfare in
animal experimentation equal to that of vertebrates since 1991. After a long process of
consultation, the European Union’s revised animal welfare regulations also concluded in
Directive 2010/63/EU Article 1, 3b that cephalopods deserve protection based on “a
review of the evidence for sentience and capacity to experience pain, suffering, distress
and lasting harm.” Fiorito et al. (2015) accordingly generated a detailed set of guidelines
for their care and welfare.
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